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BOOK REVIEW
THE TRUSTEESHIP OF LEGAL RULEMAKING
D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. Pp. 544

ROBERT

Edward S. Adams* and RichardA. Saliterman**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor Robert D. Putnam's work is, in many respects, the
contemporary companion to Democracy in America.' It comprehensively
surveys and tests common presumptions held about our democracy with
apparently very reliable quantitative data. Until recently, a work of this
depth and breadth has been unavailable. Putnam sets forth a well
supported thesis suggesting that even though American financial capital
may be at a high, its "social capital" has perhaps reached a record low,
* Howard E. Buhse Professor of Finance Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Codirector of Kommerstad Center for Business Law and Entrepreneurship at the University of
Minnesota Law School; Of Counsel, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; Principal,
Jon Adams Financial Co., L.L.P., Wayzata, Minnesota. M.B.A. 1997, Carlson School of
Management, University of Minnesota; J.D. 1988, University of Chicago Law School; B.A. 1985,
Knox College.
** President, Saliterman & Siefferman, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota; Author, ADVISING
MINNESOTA CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUsINESs ORGANIZATIONS (4 vols. 1995); L.L.M. 1974,
New York University School of Law; J.D. 1971, Columbia Law School; B.A., summa cum laude,
1968, University of Minnesota.
The Authors wish to express their appreciation to Thomas M. Crosby, Jr., Esq.; Theodore
Dorenkamp III, Esq.; John D. French, Esq.; Frederick L. Neff, Esq.; and Justice John E. Simonett
(retired); for their comments and manuscript review.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop trans. & eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835). In fact, Putnam looks at de Tocqueville's
America as the paradigm from which we have strayed. See Alan Ryan, My Way, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Aug. 10, 2000, at 47, 47.
2. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLNG ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMrMmITY 25-26 (2000).
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or at least a level similar to the social, economic, and legal bottleneck of
a century ago.' His use of empirical and combined data, however, probes
into the American spirit, indeed implying that the present setting is more
dangerous.4 This method is in contrast to many other surveys and
commentaries that are based significantly on anecdotal evidence or that
worship earlier studies founded on less than empirical or weak social
science technique
This decline in social capital is represented by a diminishing trust
by citizens in governmental institutions in every area (including legal
structures), in their own neighbors, and even in themselves.6 America is
at a crossroads. It is ultimately the responsibility of the law to supply
road maps and build the roads. The underlying issue is whether the
discourse of democracy will flourish, or whether we will end up hurtling
blindly toward some other less forgiving structure, either subtly or not."
While reflecting on his undergraduate educational experience at
Columbia, Max Frankel, the Pulitzer Prize-winning former Managing
Editor of the New York Times and refugee from Nazi Germany, said that
one might ponder how the followers of Moses and Jesus "could have
abandoned their prophetic teachings and succumbed to a pathetic,
murderous tribalism." 8 The doctrines of Hitler and Stalin can be traced
back through Hegel and Marx, all the way to Plato's "family of ideas
that proclaimed utopian truths and certitudes whose imposition by force
required the construction of 'closed' societies." 9 Those who led these
"utopian tyrannies" believed that there was a logical meaning to

3. See id. at 24-25.
4. See id. at 27.
5. It is not the purpose herein to evaluate with authority the precise scientific methodology
of Putnam. The Authors have relied more upon the commentary of others in this regard.
Nonetheless, one obvious potential shortcoming of Putnam's work is the capacity to have a "base"
or "control" set of data. See DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRACTICE OF STATISTICS 231 (2d ed. 1993) ("Control of the effects of outside variables is the first

principle of statistical design of experiments."). Accordingly, the data may not fully conform to
contemporary standards because the technique and analysis of statistics, including control groups,
may not have been fully developed. See Robert A. McLean et al., A Unified Approach to Mixed
Linear Models, 45 AM. STATISTICIAN 54, 54 (1991) ("Since many, if not most, analyses of
experimental data involve some mixed model aspect, there is an apparent need for teaching
consistent analysis procedures directed toward appropriate model selection and interpretation based
on the physical situation.").
6. See Charles Handy, Tocqueville Revisited: The Meaning of American Prosperity, HARV.
BuS. REv., Jan. 2001, at 57, 60-6 1.
7. See id. at 58.
8. MAX FRANKEL, THE TIMES OF MY LIFE AND MY LIFE wrrH THE TIMES 97 (1999).
9. Id. at 98.
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history."0 For example, it is "equally wicked" that the Nazis desired a
purified "racial tribe" and that the Communists sought a single
proletarian class."
The "return to the heroic age of tribalism" is the battle cry of the
despot that begins "with the suppression of reason and truth" but that
"must end with the most brutal and violent destruction of all that is
human."'12 Similarly, the desire to use a single historical meaning will

inevitably lead to a justification for sweeping social engineering through
brutal repression and ethnic cleansing. 3
Frankel, a First Amendment practitioner of the highest magnitude,
mirrors Putnam's underlying premise, which is significantly grounded in
First Amendment thinking. 4 The Amendment, along with law itself, is
the single main constituted enablement of social capital. 5 If it is
erroneous to use a single meaning of history through which some grand
utopian vision could be constructed out of the ashes of the past, then
social justice can only be achieved through "'piecemeal social
engineering"' in an ".open society"' of experiment, debate and
correction.'6 In fact, "[o]nly in an 'open society' could reason prevail and
violence be curbed, because experiment required universal skepticism
and the freedom to dissent."' 7 Therefore, freedom prevails only in a

system of rational discourse.' 8
There is an ultimate, intrinsic link between this piecemeal social
engineering system and the rule of law, which provides some rationale

10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 98-99 (noting that "once you conclude that freedom requires society to live by
reason... then language and discourse become more than instruments of self-expression").
15. See id. at 97; PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 171 (stressing that the freedom to communicate
"is a fundamental prerequisite for social and emotional connections").
16. FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 98 (citing 2 KR. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIErY AND ITS
ENE IES: THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY: HEGEL, MARX, AND THE AFrERMATH 238 (1962)).
17. Id.
18. See id. at 98-99. Frankel notes that he reached these conclusions based on his year-long
study of Karl Popper's seminal work on totalitarianism. See id. at 97. Popper had argued that:
Rationalism is ... bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard,
and to defend his arguments.... mhe idea of impartiality leads to that of responsibility;
we have not only to listen to arguments, but we have a duty to respond, to answer, where
our actions affect others. Ultimately, in this way, rationalism is linked up with the
recognition of the necessity of social institutions to protect freedom of criticism, freedom
of thought, and thus the freedom of men. And it establishes something like a moral
obligation towards the support of these institutions.
POPPER, supra note 16, at 238.
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for establishing Putnam's work as a document worthy of serious study
by legal scholars. Max Frankel stated:
I made the satisfying discovery of Moses, who commanded the
worship of law instead of the golden calf, and of Jesus, who
proclaimed the equality of mankind in God's love. And I came to
understand that since people are not in fact equal in talent and strength,
their equal rights to life, liberty, and opportunity had to be defined and
secured by law.19
Putnam's work reflects the continuation of this historic tug of war
between and within civilizations in the challenges and dilemmas faced
by the current democratic system in the United States. This bipolar
struggle represents the most classic of issues that confront every regime
attempting to implement new, or destroy old, legal rules. It is evidenced
by the generally repetitive and cyclical nature of civilizations leading to
their birth, rise, and eventual demise 20
Democracy is a relatively recent phenomenon, having sprung up
through the American and French Revolutions and slowly evolved in the
United States.2 ' Even though democracies are an inherently unstable
form of government, the complexities of the contemporary state tend to
break down any single mind that tries to master it.2 Where a majority
can seldom organize for any united and specific action, a modem
democracy, characterized by near universal suffrage, has a unique ability3
to replace or balance a concentration of power garnered in a minority.
Putnam's notion that democracies best support the development of ideas
and the individual-including ingenuity, innovation, self-subsistence,
and the pursuit of happiness-indicates that democracies may have the
most longevity of any particular system.2

19. FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 97 (emphasis added).
20. See WILL DURANT & ARIEL DURANT, THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 90 (1968).
21. See id. at 72. Democracy, of course, has its roots in ancient civilizations, but its
participatory nature was limited and involved a mixture of different forms of government. In ancient
Attica, for example, out of a population of 315,000, only 43,000 were able to vote: those citizens
constituting landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie (oligarchic), and small land and business owners
(democratic). Women, wage-laborers, tradesmen, shopkeepers, and 115,000 slaves were excluded.
See id. at 72-73.
22. See id. at 77-78.
23. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
24. Compare PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 336-37 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Alexis de
Tocqueville, John Stuart Mill, and John Dewey to support the proposition that democratic
participation results in a broad array of benefits for the individual as well as the public), with
DURANT & DURANT, supra note 20, at 78 (asserting that democracy has not "develop[ed] standards
and tastes to replace those with which aristocracies once kept the imagination and individualism of
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On the other hand, because of its inherent weaknesses, democracy
may have a tendency to experience an inevitable plummet into the
tyranny that Plato observed would follow the democratic chaos of class
distinction, waste, decadence, and moral degeneration." Putnam's work
tends to indicate that the decline in social capital is correlated with this
demise.
Characterizing this struggle, there is another central problem facing
a democracy, which Putnam unfortunately only partially addresses.
Democracies are based on a system of laws that may tend to maximize

artists within the bounds of intelligible communication"). Although their premise is open to debate,
the Durants observed:
Aristocracies [as a form of governmental and social organization, not the popular
notions of "aristocrats"] have inspired, supported, and controlled art, but they have rarely
produced it. The aristocrat looks upon artists as manual laborers; he prefers the art of life
to the life of art, and would never think of reducing himself to the consuming toil that is
usually the price of genius. He does not often produce literature, for he thinks of writing
for publication as exhibitionism and salesmanship. The result has been, in modem
aristocracies, a careless and dilettante hedonism, a lifelong holiday in which the
privileges of place were enjoyed to the full, and the responsibilities were often ignored.
Hence the decay of some aristocracies. Only three generations intervened between
"L'6tat c'est moi' and "Aprs moi le diluge."
Id. at 70-71.
25. See id. at 73-74. Plato observed:
[The democrats] persuade men that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and
meanness ....
... [I]nsolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence,
and impudence courage.
... [T]he father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and to fear
them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect or reverence for
either of his parents ....
...
[T]he master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their
masters and tutors; young and old are all alike ... [and old men] are loth to be thought
morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

... [The citizens] chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority and at length ...
they cease to care even for the laws ....
Such... is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.
...
[T]he excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite
direction ....
... [T]yranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form of
tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty[.]
PLATO, THE REPUBLIc 316-21 (B. Jowett trans., 1982).
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economic potential and economies of scale.26 But they may concurrently
and unwittingly also minimize redistribution of wealth and breed
concentrations of wealth and power, which in turn may gradually
necessitate a narrowing of the legal and governance authority of a
greater number of people. 27 This perhaps may be observed by the
accelerating shift of legal authority from local government to the federal
branches, distinguished by a few years of gentle persuasion on the
federal-state balance by the Supreme Court.2
These concentrations of wealth, which also carry with them a
potentially increasing litany of complex issues fueled by extraordinary
advances in technology, have such a great impact on the development
and formation of law that laws may tend to reflect these concentrations. 29
These concentrations may not necessarily be posited in individuals per
se, but in entities. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy has weighed
in on this debate, suggesting that such concentrations of wealth and
power, venued spiritually and geographically remote from the governed,
directly affect the jurisdictional reaches of government into civilization,
molding and shaping the culture of the nation, potentially ominously,
toward skepticism and dissent.30 His reasoning suggests that a similar
process has centralized power to the federal government.3 It was easy
for the federal government to ignore states' rights because the economy
26. See DE TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 1, at 268 (suggesting, as he does frequently throughout
the book, that "the material well-being that the Americans enjoy" is "one of the great causes of the
success of their laws").
27. See DURANT & DURANT, supranote 20, at 77.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the authority to usurp the states' right to address genderbased violence among their citizens); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000)
(holding that Congress could not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment protection with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
29. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECrORAL CONNECTION 92-94, 130-31
(1974) (noting that well-financed, organized efforts get positive legislative results).
30. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) ("Although the
Constitution begins with the principle that sovereignty rests with the people, it does not follow that
the National Government becomes the ultimate, preferred mechanism for expressing the people's
will."). Justice Kennedy is not alone in this view, as exhibited by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas signing on to Justice Kennedy's opinion without
further comment by concurrence. See id. at 710.
31. In Alden, Kennedy states:
Today, as at the time of the founding, the allocation of scarce resources among
competing needs and interests lies at the heart of the political process.... If the principle
of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between
competing interests must be reached after deliberation by the political process
established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal
Government and invoked by the private citizen.
Id. at 751; see also DURANT & DURANT, supranote 20, at 68.
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was ignoring state boundaries.32 Today, international government is
developing as industry, commerce, and finance override traditional
national frontiers and take an international form.3
The roots of democratic tradition and popular government in
America were able to develop strongly and efficiently because of the
convergence of several unique factors. The Durants present one possible
insight in their view (which, of course, is subject to much challenge) that
the most significant were, first, that the new world adopted the AngloSaxon legal traditions of defending citizens against the state; second,
that the Protestant traditions allowed a diversity of religious beliefs; and
third, that there was an abundance of open land and economic
opportunities. Those factors, combined with "an uprising of a native
middle class against an imported aristocracy" and the creation of a noninterventionist federal government, allowed for the liberation of "those
individualistic energies that transformed America from a wilderness to a
material utopia."3 5 The ownership of land nurtured by the toil of
common people provided the impetus behind the notion and importance
of economic and political self-determination.36 Owning land, a small
business, or a farm was a major premise behind the Homestead Act and
other western expansion and manifest destiny legislation and judicial
rulings.3 7 An important objective was to keep people and communities in
the loop, foster dignity, and maintain governmental stability."
However, a change may have occurred with the development of the
modem industrial and post-industrial state and its reliance on economies
of scale and mass-consumer-based economy. 39 The "personality and
character. . . rooted in the earth" may increasingly be evaporating due to
the concentration of populations increasingly detached from the land.'
Perhaps a bit too stridently and caustically, yet still lending some insight,
the Durants conclude that "[e]conomic freedom, even in the middle
classes, becomes more and more exceptional, making political freedom a
consolatory pretense.'

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See DURANT & DURANT, supranote 20, at 68.
See id.
See id. at 76-77.
Id.
See id.
See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 1, at 392-94.
See id. at 393-94.
See DURANT & DURANT, supranote 20, at 77.
Id.

Id.
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Nonetheless, the future is not necessarily bleak merely because land
ownership has diminished. Despite these (and other) shortcomings,
democracy has provided us with unparalleled liberation, education, and
flexibility.42 It has a reassuring quality because of its propensity to
correct mistakes.43 In fact, "[a]ll deductions having been made,
democracy has done less harm, and more good, than any other form of
government. '" Democracy has given to us "zest and camaraderie"; to
our thought, "the freedom essential to... operation and growth"; and to
our society, the removal of privilege and class. 45
For this is the vital truth beneath its catchwords: that though men
cannot be equal, their access to education and opportunity can be made
more nearly equal. The rights of man are not rights to office and
power, but the rights of entry into every avenue that may nourish and
test a man's fitness for office and power.46
Whether such a conclusion will continue to hold true depends, according
to Putnam, in large part on the ability of America's democracy to
reinvigorate the basic relationships between the individual and the
community, and on whether our system of government will encourage
the individual to feel "in the loop" and participate in the discourse of
democracy or atrophy into isolation.4 7
The final principal issue facing Western democracies arose in a
modem example of the classic dialectic between or within civilizations.'
The height of the Cold War was characterized by intense competition
between the Western democratic/capitalist school of thought and the
totalitarian Communist system.49 Unlike the historic Christian challenges

42. See id. at 78.
43. See id.
Democracy is the most difficult of all forms of government, since it requires the
widest spread of intelligence, and we forgot to make ourselves intelligent when we made
ourselves sovereign. Education has spread, but intelligence is perpetually retarded by the
fertility of the simple. A cynic remarked that "you mustn't enthrone ignorance just
because there is so much of it." However, ignorance is not long enthroned, for it lends
itself to manipulation by the forces that mold public opinion. It may be true, as Lincoln
supposed, that "you can't fool all the people all the time," but you can fool enough of
them to rule a large country.
Id. at 77-78.
44. Id. at 78.
45. Id.at 79.
46. Id.
47. Specifically, Putnam emphasizes the vital role that "voluntary associations" can play in
this regard. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 338-39.
48. See ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 148 (D.C. Somervell ed., 1957).
49. See id.

20011

THE TRUSTEESHIP OF LEGAL RULEMAKING

brought onto the world by Greco-Roman civilization, the Western world
presented a spiritually starved, secular aggressiveness against which
Communism could not defend.'o One of the byproducts of democratic
inclusiveness and a desire to be economically and politically selfdeterminant was the purgation of religion and spirituality and the
embrace of technology as the cornerstone of independence." However,
in "kick[ing] away a spiritual foundation .... [w]e had undermined our
Western belief in the sacrosanctity of the personality of individual
human beings and in the consequent rights of individuals as against the
claims of the community." 52 As a result, Communist ideology had
enormous appeal, first, because Western ideology had lost its spiritual
foundation and, second, because Communism took the spiritual initiative
in sacrificing the devoutly selfish individual for the collective interests
of the community.53 The challenge brought by Communism "made it
impossible for us in the West any longer to take our genuine belief in the
value of individual liberty for granted.""
Arnold Toynbee has written that, although the Communist threat
has all but disappeared, similar conflicts will continue in a shrinking
world unless we learn to live together as a "single family.""5 We must
"replace our current secular belief in the value of individual liberty on its
original Christian foundation-and this foundation is the Christian
vision of God as love. ' 5 6 This supports Putnam's proposition that for
democracy to survive, we must reinvest in our social capital, learning to
function in many ways as a community of individuals.57 This thinking
seems to be a significant foundation for Putnam's view of spirituality's
50. See id. at 148-49.
51. See ARNOLD TOYNBEE, The Rejection of the Doctrine of OriginalSin in the Seventeenth
Century West and Its Consequences, in ARNOLD TOYNBEE: A SELECTION FROM HIS WORKS 282,
283-84 (E.W.F. Tomlin ed., 1978).
52. Arnold J. Toynbee, Pharisee or Publican?,63 SEWANEE REv. 1, 6 (1955). Toynbee
continues:
Mhough we continued to hold this belief after we had entered on the path of
secularization, the belief had been deprived of both its vitality and its validity when once
it had been cut away from its original Christian roots. Thus the post-Christian secular
technological version of our Western Civilization was inviting a visitation of Nemesis,
and Nemesis has duly visited us in the person of Marx, in the doctrine that Marx has
preached, and in the formidable anti-Western and anti-Christian church and state that
Marxism has now called into existence.
Il
53. See id. at 2-3.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 12.
56. Id. at 7.
57. See PUTNAm, supranote 2, at 19.
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role as an element of social capital, even though his or Toynbee's
specific references to any particular religion may be invalid and
outmoded.
II. PUTNAM'S THESIS AND ITS ORIGINS
A.

The GeneralImportance of Social Capital

According to Putnam," social capital provides the groundwork
upon which other forms of capital achieve maximum productive
efficiency.59 Physical capital (tools and technology) and human capital
(education and training) provide the building blocks of productivity:
Social capital provides the structure in which physical and human capital
operates. It ensures the cohesiveness between individuals and groups
necessary to their productive use of the other capitals. 62
Putnam describes social capital as a measure of the value that social
networks and contacts provide to the individual and the community.63 He
refers to "connections among individuals-social networks and the
6
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them."
Relating social capital to the notion of civic virtue, Putnam argues that it
"calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when
embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations." r He asserts

58. For the sake of argument, the Authors render the text and quotes as descriptive. However,
these descriptions are not necessarily Putnam's views per se.
59. See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 18-19. Putnam credits a Progressive Era reformer, L.
Hanifan, with one of the earliest references to the idea of social capital. See id. at 19. According to
Hanifan:
[Social capital] refer[s] [not] to real estate or to personal property or to cash, but rather to
that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily
lives of a people; namely, good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among
the individuals and families who make up a social unit....
... The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself... If he comes into contact
with his neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital ... sufficient for the
substantial improvement of life in the whole community.
L.J. HANIFAN, THE COMMUNITY CENTER 78-79 (1920).
60. See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 19.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 20 (noting that "a well-connected individual in a poorly connected society is not
as productive as a well-connected individual in a well-connected society" and that "even a poorly
connected individual may derive some of the spillover benefits from living in a well-connected
community").
63. See id.
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id.
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that "[a] society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not
necessarily rich in social capital.""
Social capital may be fostered in numerous ways and take varying
forms, eliciting either positive or negative results. Putnam somewhat,
but not comprehensively, addresses this in his discussion on the
particular distinction between what he terms "bridging" and "bonding"
social capital. 67 Bridging social capital involves loosely formed groups
of socially diverse people with a broad commonly held value or belief.6
Putnam's examples are the civil rights movement and youth social
service groups. 69 On the other hand, bonding social capital involves more
tightly organized groups of people, "inward looking and tend[ing] to
reinforce exclusive identities." 70 Putnam identifies "ethnic fraternal
organizations, church-based women's reading groups, and fashionable
country clubs" as examples of bonding social capital.7
Putnam asserts that there are virtues of both forms of social
capital.72 Simply put, Putnam analogizes that bridging social capital is a
kind of "sociological WD-40," while bonding social capital works as
"sociological superglue. ' '73 Bridging networks succeed in linking
external assets and diffusing information. 74 Alternatively, bonding
networks are better for "undergirding specific reciprocity and mobilizing
solidarity." 75 Putnam highlights how bonding social capital works in
ethnic enclaves within the larger community. Here, the webs of ethnic
connectivity often provide "crucial social and psychological support for
less fortunate members of the community, while furnishing start-up
financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrepreneurs."76
The advantages that a firm social capital underpinning in society
provides to individuals and communities are immense. It allows for
easier resolution of collective problems and it "greases the wheels that
allow communities to advance smoothly. '77 In other words, "[w]here
people are trusting and trustworthy, and where they are subject to
repeated interactions with fellow citizens, everyday business and social
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
See id. at 22.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 22-23.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 22.
Id.
Id.

77. Id. at 288.
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transactions are less costly."78 Social capital heightens each citizen's
awareness of the consequential linkage between themselves and others.79
Those citizens that achieve "active and trusting connections to others ...
develop or maintain character traits" that benefit the entire society.Y
Social networks and social capital widen and smooth information flows
to help people achieve personal goals, especially economic- or businessrelated goals.8 ' Putnam continues, stating that "communities that lack
civic interconnections find it harder to share information and thus
mobilize to achieve opportunities or resist threats" to their well-being.82
Finally, social capital affects human psychological and biological
processes; a life rich in social capital is likely to enhance physical and
mental health. 3
The most significant theme upon which Putnam focuses is that,
despite social capital's benefits, its decline has had an impact upon
democracy and democratic processesY4 Putnam has shown that there are
fewer participants in democratic processes now due to, among other
things, the decline in direct social interaction and participation in civic
groups; a preoccupation with cheap spectator and other asocial
entertainment; and the emergence of a highly materialistic, financially
driven, and socially isolationist culture aggravated in part by
extraordinary advances in technology."'
B. Historical,Political,and Intellectual Contributionsto the
Theory of Social Capital
Putnam's thesis has substantial intellectual, political, and historical
precedent. Social capital appears to have been used as a socially
descriptive term numerous times in the twentieth century to call
attention to the ways in which the lives of citizens are made more
fruitful by having social ties.
L.J. Hanifan, a state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia,
was the first to use the phrase "social capital. 86 Later, Jane Jacobs (an

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.
See id. at 289.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 341-42.
See id. at 277-83.
See HANIFAN, supranote 59, at 78.
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urbanist),' Glenn Loury (a sociologist)," Pierre Bourdieu (a French
theorist),89 and Ekkehart Schlict (a German economist),9" were among
those expounding upon the idea that social networks contain vast
untapped social and economic resources.
Significant American commentators include sociologist James S.
Coleman, writing in the late 1980s on social capital and its effects.9'
However, an argument that is philosophically closer to Putnam's can be
found in the works of philosopher John Dewey, whose contributions
include publicizing the notion of "The Great Society." 92 The Progressive
movement itself, inspired by Dewey and reflected by other thinkers,
such as Walter Lippmann, 93 is a compelling influence on Putnam's work.
Indeed, Putnam traces much of his work to the writers of the Progressive
Era of reform, from the late 1800s to the early 1920s. 94 He even calls for
the resurrection of some of the same ideals and prescriptions. 9 The
degree of Putnam's reliance upon this paradigm to address current
problems may be one of the few limitations of Putnam's work.
However, the similarities between the Progressive Era and the
situation we face today are noteworthy. The late 1800s saw the dawning
of a new culture of leisure and materialism spawned by the Industrial
Revolution." New forms of communication and transportation bridged
land gaps, economic wealth became political power, immigration
brought new non-white groups into a land of changing forms of
economic competition and commerce, and technological change altered
the social landscape, bringing ever greater numbers of people into the

87. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 150-51 (1961)
(noting that "the presence of people who... are in the place for different purposes, but who are able
to use many facilities in common" is one of the four conditions necessary for "exuberant diversity"
in a city).
88. See Glenn C. Loury, A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences, in WOMEN,
MINORITIES, AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 153, 153 (Phyllis A. Wallace & Annette M.
LaMond eds., 1977).
89. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH
FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241,248-51 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986).
90. See Ekkehart Schlicht, Economic Analysis and Organised Religion, in SURVIVAL AND
RELIGION: BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION AND CULTURAL CHANGE 111, 143 (Eric Jones & Vernon
Reynolds eds., 1995).
91. See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OFSOCIALTHEORY 300 (1990).
92. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 96-97 (1927).
93. See, e.g., WALTER LEPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN ATrEMPr TO DIAGNOSE THE
CURRENT UNREST 18 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1985) (1914); WALTER LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO
POLITICS: AN ATrEMPr TO SKETCH AN ATTITUDE TOWARD STATECRAFT i-iv (1917).
94. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 377-81.
95. See id. at 368.
96. See id. at 372.
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cities.97 As a result, writers and politicians-such as Theodore
Roosevelt s and John Sherman (of antitrust law fame)99--decried the
decline of the community and morality, as well as the "impersonal and
attenuated" social ties brought by mass-market economic ideology.'0
Fortunately, these changing fundamentals led to an unprecedented
development and growth, or rebirth, of civic participation.'0 '
C. The Circumstancesof Democratic Cultures at Large
One recent depiction of the present Western democratic culture was
offered by the leading Oxford historian J.M. Roberts in the introductory
presentation of his new book, Twentieth Century: The History of the
World, 1901 to 2000,'02 at the English Speaking Union in New York
City.'0 3 When asked if he agreed with Time Magazine's naming Albert
Einstein as its man of the century, Roberts indicated that he would have
selected Guglielmo Marconi, the inventor of wireless communication. 4
Among other things, he indicated that it was wireless communication
that gave birth to the computer, which in turn has impacted our culture
perhaps more than any other single phenomenon.' 5 He suggested that
Marconi was significantly responsible for ushering in the information
revolution, thereby impacting contemporary culture more than any
single person in the last century. 0 Roberts seems to infer that to refer to
Einstein as the most formidable influence of the century may reflect our
society's degree of concern with materialism. The less tangible, yet
profoundly more pervasive, impacts that advancing modes of
97. See id. at 368.
98. See, e.g., THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY xi (Da Capo Press 1985) (1913).
President Roosevelt stated:
Facing the immense complexity of modem social and industrial conditions, there is need
to use freely and unhesitatingly the collective power of all of us; and yet no exercise of
collective power will ever avail if the average individual does not keep his or her sense
of personal duty, initiative, and responsibility.
Id.
99. See generally 2 JOHN SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE,
SENATE AND CABINET (1895) (autobiography of John Sherman describing his travels and political
activities).
100. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 378, 380.
101. Seeid. at382.
102. J.M. ROBERTS, TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD, 1901 TO 2000
(1999).
103. See J.M. Roberts, The Twentieth Century, Address Before the English-Speaking Union in
New York (Jan. 20, 2000).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
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communication have had on human relationships and the organization of
human society are more worthy of our notice. Putnam's thesis, based
largely on observations of these intangible variables and their
interactions, much aligns with Roberts' theory. According to Putnam,
we must take notice while we are able to.'l 7
Roberts also presents an excellent background with which to
appreciate Putnam's thesis. Roberts indicates, among other things, that
the material wealth produced by the world (particularly by democracies)
0 3 Also, the material wealth gap
is now at an unprecedented level."
between the rich and the poor has widened.' °9 This absorption of material
resources comes amid dynamic upward trends in population growth,
characterized by higher birth rates and longer average life spans." At
the same time, Roberts adds, astounding technological and scientific
advances have not curbed the growing scale of the depletion of raw
material resources."'
Arguably, the most significant historical dynamic of the twentieth
century impacting our culture has been at the ideological level. Our
anxiety level has perhaps never been greater. In a very short span of
time, the twentieth century has witnessed worldwide ideological
battles." 2 They range from the perhaps naYve and ideological motivations
behind Woodrow Wilson's futile attempts at "making the world safe for
democracy" with the League of Nations"3 to the similarly misguided
ideologies espoused by the highly regimented, controlled, and
centralized societies of Nazism and Soviet-style Communism." 4 Modem
democratic society and culture has developed over a very short and
intense period of time, and has experienced so many extremes in
idealism, that it may essentially become paralyzed in its course by fear
of the chance encounter with another stiff opponent. Indeed, this fear
may have a rational foundation, as pursuits of idealism can have the
exact opposite result than intended.
This effectively raises the stakes in the choice between not taking
any action in the face of the well-established and identified trends
presented by Putnam and taking swift, overly reactive, and idealistic
actions that might only intensify problems. Interestingly, this idealism
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See PuTNAm,supranote 2, at 107.
See ROBERTS, supra note 102, at 587-88.
See id. at 588.
See id. at 585-86.
See id. at 579-80.
See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 102, at 301; TOYNBEE, supranote 48, at 148-49.
See ROBERTS, supra note 102, at 275-76.
See id. at 297, 316-17.
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may be somewhat present in Putnam's proposals for addressing the low
social capital problem." 5
Putnam's thesis and the concerns underlying it have been echoed
even more intensively in recent months by various organizations,
academic institutions, and scholars." 6 At a pace and breadth of debate
perhaps unparalleled in American history, especially for works
emanating from scholarly centers, writings presenting similar theses
have surfaced."7
In quantitative terms, perhaps even if unintended, some scholars
assert that the disrespect for those in Congress charged with governing
the populace has never been greater."8 In effect, one team of
commentators has stated, congressional members may perhaps ignore
public opinion polls.'' 9 There is a gulf of unprecedented dimensions that
exists between the public and the legislative branch, despite the fact that
the legislative branch is perhaps the single most visible symbol of
democracy, represents the theoretical
expression of social capital, and is
20
rules.
legal
of
the formulator
What we see today in contemporary American politics, however,
far exceeds responsible leadership in a representative democracy. We
see troublesome indications of declining responsiveness to public
opinion, shown by the growing list of policies on which, without explicit
justification,
politicians of both major political parties ignore public
2
opinion. 1
Similarly, the 2000 presidential candidates' positions on the
"dimpled chads and absentee ballots [were] more compelling than were
their positions during the election campaign on education and Social
Security," as one seasoned scholar-Robert Reich, former labor
secretary in the Clinton administration-has indicated.'22 The voter
apathy was perhaps the result of scripted campaigns, boring conventions,
and the public's inability (or disinterest) in identifying the differences
between candidates' positions on important issues.' 23 Voter turnout
115. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 402-14.
116. See Walter Kiechel, The New New Capital Thing, HARV. BUS. REv., July-Aug. 2000, at
149, 150 (reviewing PUTNAM, supra note 2).
117. Seeid. at154n.1.
118.

See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER:

POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE Loss OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS 5 (2000).

119.
120.
121.
122.
2000, at
123.

Seeid. at5-6.
See id. at 124-27.
See id. at 126-27.
Robert B. Reich, Editorial, This Isn't a Civics Lesson-It's a Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
A29.
See id.
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increased slightly, but "still only about half of registered voters bothered
going to the polls."'24 Once the citizenry voted, and the difference
between incredible power and no power was so close, the candidates
criticized each other's integrity.2' Additionally, they "unleashed legions
of lawyers to argue about the intentions of former legislators and dead
constitutionalists who never contemplated that a few hundred chads
might decide who held the most powerful office in the world.' 26 The
result was that each candidate sincerely believed he had won the
election, but neither seemed to be bothered by the damage they had
caused to "the institutions and laws whose legitimacy ha[d] been called
into question."' 27 Perhaps too cynically, it was even suggested that
Republicans "staged protests to look as if average Americans were
their outrage at the recounts, using political insiders as
expressing
'
actors."'
The election was merely a microcosm of "the bitter divisiveness
within the political class brought on by the hearings on the Supreme
Court nominations of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, by special
prosecutor Lawrence Walsh's Iran-contra indictments, [and] by the
Gingrich-Clinton showdown that closed the federal government."'29
Reich contends that each of these battles has "rendered Washington
steadily less capable of doing the public's business.' ' 30 He concludes that
the result is an ever-decreasing public confidence in elected officials'
willingness to put society's interests above their own. 3
Finally, there has been a similar, even shrill, warning against
institutions that have been introduced to advance worldwide democracy
since the end of the Cold War.3 2 These creations may have had the
the erosion of social capital,
unintended consequence of encouraging
33
according to one recent work.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Seeid.
See MORRIS BERMAN, THE TWILIGHT OF AMERICAN CULTuRE 65 (2000).
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III. PUTNAM'S PROOF: INQUIRIES INTO THE CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN SOCIAL FABRIC

A.

Generally

Putnam's reliance on an unprecedented amount of quantitative data
to support his thesis is the book's single strongest merit. From this data,
Putnam is able to glean and isolate historical trends and currents not
necessarily discernible by mere anecdotal evidence, and draw significant
inferences concerning social capital and its connection to the democratic
process.
While Putnam does not formulate any single finding directly related
to the effect of law on social capital, he suggests that in many ways4
reliance on law attempts to cover the social capital deficit.'1
Nevertheless, each of Putnam's findings provides a persuasive and
chilling commentary on the intrinsic relationship between social capital
and the survival of the rule of law.135 As indicated earlier, he offers some
prescriptive comments drawing heavily from the last great sea of change
and low social capital level ushering in the Progressive Era.'3 This last
part of the work, that deals with how to address the problem of low
social capital, although providing many vital and insightful comments,
leaves room for clarity and further development.
We will not attempt to address every permutation on the social
capital theory upon which Putnam extensively elaborates, but will
attempt to summarize Putnam's work, and offer commentary on the
social capital theory as it relates to evolution of law in recent years.
B. PoliticalParticipation
Putnam argues that voting in political elections is the most common
measure of democratic participation. 37 Although voting rates in
American political elections rank below those of other democracies,
Putnam indicates that the real question is not how we compare with
others but rather how we compare with our own past.' In examining
election trends, his results are not encouraging, and they include a
finding that, while 62.8 percent of Americans of voting age went to the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 145.
See id. at 145-46.
See id. at 401-04.
Seeid. at31.
See id.
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polls to select a president in 1960, only 48.9 percent went to the polls in
1996.39 The dynamics of any particular race aside, the trends over the
past forty years reflect a 25 percent downward slide in voting for
president, representing the largest and longest decline in political
participation in American history. 44 Voter turnout in off-year, state, and
across all age
local elections reflects a similar trend, and is apparent
1 41
groups and most geographic regions of the country.
Putnam also relates that political knowledge and interest in public
affairs, generally viewed as a prerequisite to full participation in
democracy, has also fallen dramatically. 4 1 Theoretically, formal
education breeds civic knowledge and interest, but while we may be
better educated than our parents and grandparents, the average college
graduate today knows little more about political affairs than the average
high school graduate of the 1940s. 43 Indeed, "the post-baby boom
generations... are substantially less knowledgeable about public affairs,
despite the proliferation of sources of information" and the ease of
144
access.
Ironically, Putnam continues, those with a higher education are
increasingly less likely to become involved.'45 Attendance at public
meetings by the college educated has nearly halved, from 36 percent to
18 percent since 1964.' 46 He suggests that, because the less educated
were less participatory to begin with, their rates of participation have
declined by even greater numbers in relative terms. This is supported
by data that show attendance at public meetings by those with only a
7
high school education fell from 20 percent to 8 percent, and from
4
earlier.'
even
ended
education
whose
those
for
percent to 3 percent
This knowledge gap does not appear confined to politics.
According to data that Putnam presents, it applies equally to general
news of current events and affairs.' 9 "Daily newspaper readership
among people under [age] thirty-five dropped from two-thirds in 1965 to
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143.
144.
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146.
147.
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See id. at 31-32.
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one-third in 1990,''50 while television news viewership among the same
group fell from over 50 percent to 41 percent) 5
While political organization staff membership has increased over
the past decades, Putnam reveals that actual citizen participation in
campaign activities has fallen dramatically. 152 The ranks of the party
loyal have thinned, with fewer people identifying with any particular
political party.' 53 Membership in grassroots organizations and political
party volunteering has also fallen radically." The parties themselves are
better financed, professionally staffed, and often hire marketing agencies
to man the phone banks. 55 The result, or maybe the reason, is that fewer
Americans participate in political activities. 5 6 At the same time, political
campaign spending per se has exploded.'57 Putnam concludes that
politics has become an industry, rather than an act of duty-minded
citizenship.'
According to Putnam, while the finance, marketing, advertising,
and operating expenses of political campaigns have increased over the
past twenty years, "the number of office seekers in any year at all levels
in the American body politic-from school board to town councilshrank by perhaps 15 percent."'59 At this rate, Americans have had a
quarter million fewer candidates to choose from annually 6° In fact, there
are sixteen million fewer participants in local public meetings, "eight
million fewer committee members, eight million fewer local
organizational leaders, and three million fewer men and women61
organized to work for better government" than in the mid-1970s.'
Furthermore, Putnam shows that such basic forms of political expression
as signing petitions, writing to a congressperson or a newspaper editor,
and making a speech have fallen dramatically.' 62
Finally, Putnam suggests that these trends indicating an alienation
from the political sphere reflect a real decline in the level of trust the
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body politic holds in its political institutions. 63 In fact, Putnam indicates
that, "[i]n the 1990s, roughly three in four Americans didn't trust the
government."''
In contrast, "Americans in the mid-1960s were
strikingly confident in the benevolence and responsiveness of their
political institutions."' Approximately one-quarter of those surveyed
agreed that "[p]eople like me don't have much say in government" and
"[p]ublic officials don't care what people like me think." '66 Conversely,
75 percent thought that they "could 'trust the government in Washington
to do what is right all or most of the time."" 67 Even in 1966, amidst the
Vietnam War and race riots in several major metropolitan areas, twothirds of those surveyed disagreed with the opinion that6 8"the people
running the country don't really care what happens to you."'
The contemporary position is that these views are "antiquated or
naive," as "[i]n virtually every case the proportions agreeing and
disagreeing with such ideas essentially have been reversed.' 6 9 In the

1990s, about 75 percent of those surveyed did not "trust the government
to do what is right all or most of the time,"'7 and in 1997, during "the
longest period of peace and prosperity in more than two generations,"
just over half of the Americans surveyed believed that "the people
running the country don't really care what happens to you.' 7' Putnam

concludes that the contemporary viewpoint "may or may not be more
accurate than the Pollyannaish views of the early sixties, but they
undermine the political7 confidence necessary to motivate and sustain
political involvement.'
C. Civic Participation
Putnam argues that official membership in a voluntary civic group
or organization is often a good indicator of civic participation.7 3 These
voluntary associations can be classified in three sub-categories:
community-based, church-based, and work-based.'7 4 He indicates that, at
163.
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first glance, it appears that there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of voluntary associations over the past thirty years.'75 After all,
he points out, the number of national non-profit organizations more than
doubled, to nearly 23,000, between 1968 and 1997.76 However bright
this statistic may seem, Putnam indicates that few of the tens of
thousands of non-profit associations actually have mass membership;
indeed, many have no members whatsoever. 17 In fact, he continues, the
median number of members in national associations declined from an
average of approximately 10,000 in 1962 to as few as 1000 in 1998.7
Putnam notes an increasing centralization of these organizations to
headquarters in cities having an intrinsic benefit, such as the heaviest
concentrations of its members or greater access to policy-makers.' 79 For
example, even though most of the members of the American Association
of Retired Persons live in Florida, California, and Arizona, the
organization chose a Washington, D.C., headquarters in order to have
the most visible and direct impact upon policy-making circles. 80 As a
result, locally based units and chapters have simply disappeared."
In fact, Putnam notes, most of the newer associations are
"professionally staffed advocacy organizations ....focus[ed] on
expressing policy views ... not on providing regular connection among
individual members at the grass roots.' ' 2 He provides data showing that
the more recently an association was founded, the less likely it is to have
a local chapter for organizing local member meetings.'
Putnam
suggests that "[i]n many respects, [social] organizations have more in
common with mall-order commercial organizations than with oldfashioned face-to-face associations."' For example, Putnam notes the
tripling of veterans' organizations between 1980 and 1997.' However,
for the same period of time, the rate of membership in those same
organizations "fell by roughly 10 percent."'86 While the number of trade
unions grew 4 percent from 1980 to 1997, actual membership fell by
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over 35 percent.' By the late 1960s to the early 1970s, the growth rate
of membership in national organizations "began to fall further behind
population growth.""'
Putnam suggests that membership in local organizations may be a
better indicator of social capital trends.' 9 He relies on membership
trends in local parent-teacher associations as the most dramatic example
of community disengagement.' Parent-teacher associations experienced
a phenomenal rise in membership, to over 45 percent of families with
school-age children by 1960.1"' Since then, membership has fallen to
fewer than 20 percent.'2 Generally speaking, however, formal
membership in voluntary organizations has not experienced a great
decline, in large part because of the offsetting effects of increased
membership in professional and other special-interest organizations.'
Putnam dismisses this fact as misleading, arguing that there is a
fundamental distinction between membership and active membership."9
To better reflect participation in voluntary associations, Putnam
shows that, for those organizations with local chapters, the percentage of
people "who took any leadership role in any local organization ... was
sliced by more than 50 percent" over the past twenty years.' Putnam
points out that "in the mid-1970s nearly two-thirds of all Americans
attended club meetings, but by the late 1990s nearly two-thirds of all
Americans never do."'96 This led to a decline in the number of such
meetings, from an average of twelve per year in 1975 to slightly more
than four per year by 1999. 97 Rates are even more steep and radical for
college graduates, whose average number of annual club meetings fell
by 55 percent from the 1960s to the 1990s. 98 Since the mid-1960s,
formal membership generally has decreased by 10 to 20 percent.'"
Concurrently, active involvement has been collapsing, reflected by
"more than halving most indexes of participation within barely a few
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decades." Putnam concludes that, if statistical patterns continue and
the current rate of decline persists, most voluntary associations will
vanish in America in less than twenty years.-'
D. Religious Participation
Putnam points out the important role of organized spirituality and
religion in sustaining democracy, noting that "[flaith communities in
which people worship together are arguably the single most important
repository of social capital in America." Putnam's evidence shows that
roughly half of all association memberships, personal philanthropy, and
3
volunteering is directly related to a religious functionY2
According to Putnam, the social capital derived from a social
relationship to a religious organization is clear: "Churches provide an
important incubator for civic skills, civic norms, community interests,
and civic recruitment."' ' There is a direct and profound correlation
between membership in a religious group and participation in basic
forms of civic involvement, such as "voting, jury service, community
projects, talking with neighbors, and giving to charity." 5 For example,
"75-80 percent of church members give to charity, as compared with 5560 percent of nonmembers, and 50-60 percent of church
members
26
volunteer, while only 30-35 percent of nonmembers do." 0
The decrease in participation in religious-related activities is
indicative of the decline of social capital.20 According to Putnam's data,
church membership has declined since its peak in the mid-1960s.20
Church attendance has experienced a decline of approximately 15 to 20
percent since the 1970s. 0 Moreover, aside from Sunday sermon
attendance, participation in church-sponsored social activities (such as
Sunday school or social and study groups) has fallen by approximately
30 percent since the 1960s and by more than half since the 1950s.210
Putnam notes sociological studies showing that the social
revolution of the late 1960s and 1970s had the collateral effect of turning
200.
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people away from organized forms of religion and spirituality toward a
more personally autonomous, individualistic experience. 2" He concludes
that privatized religion generates less social capital despite its attributes
of being "morally compelling and psychically fulfilling. ''21 2 It creates
congregation-surfing and decreases the commitment to any particular
community. 23 At the same time, the number of persons who indicate
they have no religion
214 whatsoever rose 2 percent per decade from the
1940s to the 1990s.
Perhaps most interestingly, Putnam's findings indicate that, amid
this overall decline, the country is becoming more spiritually divided,
between the "devoutly observant" on the one hand and the "entirely
unchurched" on the other.2 3 Additionally, there are geographic
dimensions, as disengagement is more pronounced in the northern states
while the south has not experienced the deep declines.2 6 Among
religious groups, as a percentage of the total American population,
Protestant membership has fallen off 3 to 4 percent per decade since
World War II, while the percentage of Jews has declined by
approximately half a percentage point per decade.217 Although Protestant
evangelical membership has risen by approximately one-third over the
past twenty-five years, these gains had little impact on the general
28
downward trends in membership in established religious groups.
Conversely, Catholics have increased their ranks by just over 1
percent per decade, primarily through the influx of immigrants from
Latin America.2 9 Putnam notes that there has been a religious revival in
America by evangelical and, to a lesser extent, Catholic congregations
that tend to be not only religiously but also socially exclusive,
exemplifying the bonding type of social capital typically engendered by
these groups. 20 Putnam also states that these conservative congregations
tend to be more active within their groups but less active in the wider
community, offering, with few exceptions, comparatively fewer
community-wide
services than more liberal or moderate
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congregations.22 This observation is, of course, not necessarily a correct
one, and may be seriously challenged. While this part of Putnam's work
expresses, even favors, possible (instead of simple) conclusions, it
nevertheless does provide very informative data and challenges for all.
E. Connections in the Workplace
Putnam indicates that, after a surge in the 1940s and 1950s, union
membership has plummeted, from approximately 32 percent of the
workforce to 14 percent in 1999.' z He concludes that the strides made in
union membership as a bastion of social capital and a network of
reciprocity spawned by the New Deal have disappeared, relegated in
function to mere bargaining agents.m "By the end of the twentieth
century ... this once central element in the social life of working
Americans had virtually vanished." 4 Between 1953 and 1997, union
membership in the manufacturing sector declined by 62 percent, by 79
percent in the mining industry, by 78 percent in the construction
industry, and by 60 percent in the transportation industry.m As noted
above, Putnam finds that the number of professional associations, as
well as their membership, has increased dramatically since the end of
World War II, but as a percentage of the available pool of professionals,
here, too, membership has experienced steady declines since the
1960s. 226
Putnam indicates that changes in the character of work and the
workplace since the 1980s have had the effect of encouraging a more
social atmosphere. 7 However, he also argues that this does not translate
into greater social connectivity.' In fact, Putnam shows that, despite the
changes, there has been no increase over the past four decades in the
number of personal connections between co-workers. 229 Although coworkers account for about 10 percent of our friends, those "[w]orkplace
ties tend to be casual and enjoyable, but not intimate and deeply
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supportive." 0 Thus, the small percentage of co-worker friends is even
smaller when discounted for closeness, '
Putnam adds that while the changing nature of work, business
structure, and the economy have had a positive effect on productivitysuch as "[m]ore independence from the firm, flatter hierarchies, less
paternalism, and more reward for merit"-they have had an equally
destructive impact upon trust and social connectedness.2 2 The ultimate
impact is determined by law and the validity of present legal rules.23
Increased job anxiety due to the heavy restructuring of the 1980s and
1990s, as well as the demise of seniority and loyalty-based rewards,
indicates that, "although job instability remains higher among bluecollar workers, it has increased much more rapidly among white-collar
workers, who account for a growing fraction of the workforce and who
have traditionally contributed disproportionately to civic life."
The traditional implicit employment contract based on trust in job
stability often has been replaced by an actual legal document securing
the responsibilities of the worker and employer.2 5 Furthermore, Putnam
notes that structural changes in the workplace, including increases in
short-term, part-time, temporary, and commuter jobs, inhibit social
capital formation and the development of social ties.2 6 According to
Putnam, 75 percent of all independent contractors, for example, claim to
have no regular co-workers, let alone colleagues, 2 7 and "[r]ecent surveys
suggest that as many as one in four employees are chronically angry on
the job." 3 The result, many researchers believe, is that instability and
aggression in the workplace are increasing in tandem.2 9
Indeed, Putnam concludes that the workplace may actually
contribute to the decline in social connectivity, especially as the
workplace becomes more restrictive and controlled. 2,° Not surprisingly,
privacy in the workplace has become a hot political and legal issue, and
Putnam notes (but does not examine) several recent court decisions
giving employers wide discretion to monitor employees' communication
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and activities. 4' "Rights of free speech and privacy that are essential to
public deliberation and private solidarity are, to put it mildly, insecure in
the workplace." 242 Putnam suggests that significant public and private
efforts must be made to ensure that social connectedness is not worsened
in the workplace. 2"
F. Informal Social Connections
Putnam suggests that informal social connections with friends and
family foster and sustain social networks, albeit with less impact and
breadth than more formal civic engagements. 2 ' Similar to participation
in civic activities, these informal connections have seen significant
declines over the past twenty-five years.245 The average American
entertained friends at home about fourteen or fifteen times a year in the
1970s, and only eight times per year by the late 1990s.24 Simply visiting
friends at their homes experienced similar declines, and this decline was7
not impacted by only marginal increases in dining out with friends.2
Most significantly, the family dinner, a barometer of family
connectedness, is increasingly becoming a relic of some past
generation. 24 Putnam indicates that those married people who definitely
agree with the statement, "our whole family usually eats dinner
together" has declined from approximately 50 percent to 34 percent over
the past 20 years 49 Other surveys provide further evidence that family
members spend significantly less time socializing with each other.20
Data indicates that family vacations with school-age children fell from
53 percent to 38 percent between 1976 and 1997; watching television
together fell from 54 percent to 41 percent; family religious service
attendance fell from 38 percent to 31 percent; and "just sitting and
talking" fell from 53 percent to 43 percent.2'
Putnam also finds that people spend less time socializing at bars,
nightclubs, discos, and taverns, as such activity by both married and
single people declined by between 40 and 50 percent over the past
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
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twenty years 252 Likewise, anonymous fast-food restaurants, which
Putnam terms "personal refueling stations," have increasingly replaced
full-service restaurants.5 3 Other forms of critical social contact that
engender social capital-such as playing cards, sending greeting cards,
or spending a social evening with a neighbor-have fallen radically as
well.54
Critically, as suggested, Putnam reports that participation rates in
most sports have also fallen in recent decades. 2 5 His data shows that,
while soccer and basketball, as well as fitness activities for the
individual, have gained in popularity, participation in team sports has
generally declined.256 Putnam points out that younger Americans have
led this decline, while older people have actually increased their sports
activities.2" Bowling, on the other hand, has seen record growth 5 8 But
we are "bowling alone" more often, as league bowling has plummeted
by more than 40 percent in the last decade.2 9 Overall, the evidence
26
clearly shows that Americans are becoming consumer spectators.
"silently] withdraw[ing] from social intercourse" and content to watch
others participate. 26'
G. Altruism, Volunteering, and Philanthropy
Putnam begins with the following premise:
[Tihose of us who belong to formal and informal social networks are
more likely to give our time and money to good causes than those of us
who are isolated socially.... Thus any assessment of trends in social
capital must include an examination of trends in volunteering,
philanthropy, and altruism. 262
Though Americans seem to believe that giving money is an appropriate
alternative to giving time, Putnam suggests that "volunteering and
philanthropy are complements, not substitutes." 263 Thus, those who
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volunteered were more likely to also give money, and vice versa.26' In
addition, Putnam says, "by far the most consistent predictor of giving
time and money is involvement in community life."'
Although per capita charitable monetary giving has doubled since
1960, Putnam's data shows that Americans dedicate a smaller share of
their income to charitable purposes than at any time since the 1940s,
paralleling other trends in American civil engagement.2 As a fraction of
national income, total monetary giving has plummeted from 2.26 percent
in 1964 to 1.61 percent in 1998.67 Putnam suggests that, had charitable
giving rates of the 1960s continued unabated, "U.S. religious
congregations would have over $20 billion more annually, and total
national philanthropic giving would jump by roughly $50 billion a
year."26' He notes that such declines have been especially aggravated by
negative trends in congregation memberships and falling donations per
member because "half of all charitable giving in America is religious in
nature. 269 Of all Protestant charitable giving, the declines have been
most acute in "external" giving, as opposed to internal congregation
finances. 7 °
Putnam observes that identifying trends in volunteerism has been
more difficult because, while volunteering on an individual basis is up,
Americans participate in fewer community projects organized by some
civic group. 27' "[C]ommitments to volunteerism are more fragile and
more sporadic now that they depend on single-stranded obligations,
without reinforcement from well-woven cords of organizational
involvement. 272
The rise in volunteerism can be attributed to pre-baby boom
generation Americans who, according to Putnam, are most predisposed
to civic engagement in the first place.2 73 "Volunteers are more interested
in politics and less cynical about political leaders" than are nonvolunteers, suggesting that the wholesale abandonment of volunteering
by people born between 1950 and 1965 parallels and aggravates the
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eroding trends of social capital. 4 On the other hand, evidence suggests
that young Americans (those born in the 1970s) "displayed a

commitment to volunteerism without parallel among their immediate
predecessors[,] ...[a] promising sign." 275

H. Reciprocity, Honesty, and Trust
Putnam points out that lower "transaction costs" come with greater
reciprocity, honesty, and trust between citizens. 27 6 Putnam distinguishes
social trust from trust in government institutions: "Trust in government
may be a cause or a consequence of social trust, but it is not the same

thing as social trust." 27 A lack of social trust increases not only

commercial transaction costs, but also costs expended in the everyday
business and worries of life.278 Putnam postulates that communities that
engender reciprocity and trust, thus requiring fewer elements of legal
force, enjoy a substantial efficiency over those lacking trust.279
Unfortunately, most Americans increasingly agree that society and
people in general are far less trustworthy, honest, and moral2 0 Indeed,
this decline in social trust can be seen most clearly in the fact that, by
increasingly fewer people think that "most people can be
generation,
trusted.''2 t
The demise of generalized trust and reciprocity can be seen by the
decline in interpersonal (although not mail) participation in surveys, the
increase in the number of unlisted telephone numbers and call screening
274. Id. at 132.
275. Id. at 133.
276. See id.at 135. Professor Ward Farnsworth defines "transaction costs":
A pragmatic definition of "transaction costs"-one based on the consequences of the
term for judicial purposes-is that they are impediments to bargaining that should be
regarded as bad, as "noise," as problems that courts should help the parties overcome by
putting the rights into the hands of the party who would end up with them if only the
impediments weren't in the way.
Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the
Cathedral,66 U. Cm-.L. REv. 373,408 (1999).
277. PuTNAM, supra note 2, at 137.
278. See id. at 135.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 139 & fig.37.
Most Americans today believe that we live in a less trustworthy society than our
about fifty-fifty on the issue of whether
parents did. In 1952, ... Americans were split
our society was then as upright morally as it had been in the past. In 1998, however, after
nearly four decades of growing cynicism, we believe by a margin of three to one that our
society is less honest and moral than it used to be.
Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
281. Seei. at 139-41.
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devices, and increased incidences of road rage and failures to observe
traffic laws.28 Ironically, the return rate for voluntary census forms has
declined by more than 25 percent since 1960.28 The return rate decline is
particularly prevalent among those most "detached from community
institutions" and those who have the lowest amount of social trust.2M
These are the same people, Putnam observes, who are most likely to trust
the government:8 5
In short, at century's end, a generation with a trust quotient of nearly
80 percent was being rapidly replaced by one with a trust quotient of
barely half that. The inevitable result is steadily declining social trust,
even though each individual cohort is almost as trusting as it
286

ever was.

Very importantly, Putnam indicates that the transaction costs of
lower social trust relates to the phenomenal growth of the security and
legal professions since 1970.287 As trust ebbs, reliance on "formal
mechanisms of social control and dispute resolution" flows. 8 The
standard explanations of rising crime rates, government regulation, and
government welfare programs cannot account for the flood of lawyers
into society.28 9 A perceived link between socioeconomic affluence and
the increased number of attorneys is not sufficiently illuminating.2
Rather, the growth in the legal profession seems to come from an
increase in the demand for "preventive lawyering" that arose in the
1970s with the end of the adequacy and prudence of informal
understandings of the law.2 9' Everybody, regardless of their relationship
to those with whom they were dealing, suddenly began to demand
everything "in writing." 292
This shift mirrors the trends in other measures of social capital
earlier identified by Putnam, and the abrupt changes in our approach to
the law correspond in time to the sudden changes in other community
factors.293 This reliance on getting it in writing is "one of the most
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revealing indicators of the fraying of our social fabric."2 4 It indicates our
increasing reliance on formal institutions to accomplish what was
formerly realized through social capital, the "informal networks
reinforced by generalized reciprocity." 295
More importantly, if social capital in the form of relationships with
friends, colleagues, and community cannot now provide support and a
sense of well being through an ability to confide, people are increasingly
turning to paid confidants or surrogate community. 96
L

Concluding Observations

Putnam attempts to explain three distinct examples of seemingly
positive social capital changes in the American landscape. He says that,
on one end, there has been an emergence of small groups, which serve as
"anchors in the emotional and social lives of millions of Americans." 29'
On the other, various social movements have blossomed, attracting
thousands or millions under an umbrella of common belief.98
is the rapid development of high technology
Complicating both
299
S•
telecommumcations.
Yet his data suggests that, while small social groups "contribute to
civic engagement and social capital," such groups do not replace the
social capital formed through traditional civic organizations.so They also
have not offset the "civic decay of the past several decades."3' ' While
social movements can "create social capital, by fostering new identities

294. Id.

295. Id.
296. See id. (citing Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public
Opinion, Jokes, and PoliticalDiscourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 806-07 (1998) (supporting the
proposition that the "'artificial trust' provided by lawyers has replaced "'its low-cost rival')); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 2.1 (2001) ("In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation.").
Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially
where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant.
Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a
lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.
... [Tihe lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include indicating that more may
be involved than strictly legal considerations.
Id. R. 2.1 cmts. 2-3.
297. PuTNAm, supranote 2, at 148.
298. See id.

299. See id.
300. Id. at 150.
301. Id.
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and extending social networks[,] '30 2 whether the social movements of the
1960s represent the birth of a new form of civic engagement or merely
3
"the cresting of a long wave of rising civic involvement" is unclear.
However, as suggested previously, unlike movements in the 1960s
characterized by heavy grassroots involvement and widespread public
sentiment, most post-1960s era movements, such as the environmental
movement, have much relied on Washington D.C.-based, full-time,
professional staff to organize political and recruitment efforts.0 4
Membership in most of these types of groups is "essentially an honorific
rhetorical device for fundraising.... [and] does not represent the sort of
interpersonal solidarity and intense civic commitment" involved in
1960s and 1970s era movements. 3 5 Thus, these movements provide little
social capital development. 306 Putnam notes that many of these groups,
especially environmental organizations, have become "addicted to direct
mail as a tool of mobilization and membership retention" and typically
"allocate 20-30
percent of their budget to fund-raising and associated
advertising. ''",301°
Putnam suggests
that the
advent of computer-aided
telecommunications (Internet, e-mail, etc), has allowed many people to
sustain existing social ties.04 Additionally, in this more egalitarian
setting, we have, to some extent, been able to develop new ties, albeit in
an anonymous, socially, and morally blind context.30 Nevertheless,
Putnam points out that the effect of the Internet on civic engagement is
less than clear. 310 "The absence of any correlation between Internet usage
and civic engagement could mean that the Internet attracts reclusive
nerds and energizes them ...
, ,31

[or] attracts civic dynamos and sedates

them.

Relying on other sociological research, Putnam concludes that
computer-supported social networks allow users to switch "'rapidly and
frequently between groups of ties,"' sustaining a broad array of shallow
social relationships and facilitating the transmission of information
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between distant people. 2 Research thus far has shown that computeraided information enriches "intellectual capital" and helps to sustain
large, more fluid groups in any number of structural forms. 3 Though
these groups can ignore geographic, organizational, and political
boundaries, there is "no data to indicate whether that3 14flow of information
itself fosters social capital and genuine community.
In fact, communication-by-computer inhibits many mechanisms of
social connectedness." 5 The computer may be an outlet for expression so
long as someone is listening. 3 6 The oft-referenced "digital divide"
threatens a sort of "cyberapartheid, in which bridging social capital 3 is17
diminished as elite networks become less accessible to the have-nots.
Computer users tend to be "younger, highly educated, upper-income
white males," and every indication suggests the gap is widening. 31' In
addition, technology has not enabled computer users to cue in on facial
and other non-verbal forms of expression and communication, often
essential in establishing and building interpersonal trust and
reciprocity. 39 Computer-based communication tends to be interestspecific and single-stranded, which may have the effect of decreasing
social cohesion by "cyberbalkanizing" the Internet. 20 Putnam concludes
by suggesting that it is still unclear whether computer-aided
32'
communication will have any positive impact upon social capital.
Putnam's own quantitative data in the area of computer impact is weak
and undeveloped.
IV. PUTNAM'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Putnam's work contains a number of methodical attributes with
possible spillover significance that make it monumental and worthy of
comment. It may be the single most comprehensive, concise, and
articulate application of quantitative social science technique to test
hypotheses or foundations upon which American democracy rests.
312. Id. (citing Barry Wellman et al., Computer Networks as Social Nenvorks: Collaborative
Work Telework and Virtual Community, 22 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 213,213 (1996)).
313. See id.
314. See id. at 172.
315. See id. at 174-80.
316. See id. at 174 ("Millions more of us can express our views with the click of a mouse, but
is anyone listening?").
317. Id. at 174-75.
318. Id. at 174.
319. See id. at 175.
320. See id. at 177-78.
321. See id. at 179.

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 30:483

Putnam persuasively and convincingly suggests that much of the
American legal structure is being developed upon a swampy soil-in a
vacuum of voluntary civic disengagement and apathy.
First, Bowling Alone is refreshing because it exposes key subjects
to legal and social discourse by using quantitative data to an extent no
other single work has done. In a sense, Putnam gives us an opportunity
to dispense with the traditional mainstay deductive approach to problemsolving. He allows us to identify broad underlying social dynamics so
we can structure law to respond to, correct, and even encourage behavior
using a more inductive approach. Much of our trusted Aristotelian logic
may no longer exist. This takes on increasing importance when, as some
critics would say, the legislative branch is perhaps gradually becoming
the micro-manager of daily life, codifying common law, usurping
judicial discretion, and, as a result, stripping the judicial branch of its
traditional function, which is to evaluate civic duties by their merits'22
A second contribution of Putnam-less methodological or broad,
yet vital-is his invalidation of a number of specific popular myths that
have guided lawyers, the judiciary, legal educators, and other trustees of
the American culture. Putnam's data indicates that, fortunately or
otherwise, formal education itself does not automatically create
improved social capital and civic participation. 3z Also, his data indicates
that sprawling suburban neighborhoods are not repositories of social
capital, and actually may contribute to the problem of social capital
deficit.3 24 Conversely, inner-city neighborhood structures reflect, in many
not-yet-recognized ways, some key components or varieties of social
capital.3'2 His data indicates that older generations are perhaps the most
civic-minded and participatory, and that younger generationsespecially baby boomers-have essentially withdrawn from society. 3
He highlights data indicating that public interest groups, trade
associations, lobbyists, most modem centralized social movements, and
other influence peddlers do not seem to be serving as mechanisms or
conduits for social and civic participation.327 Contrary to some
assumptions underpinning secularization fostered by the First
Amendment, he interestingly presents data indicating that religious and
322. See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEo. L.J. 2589, 2591-93 (1998).
323. See, e.g., PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 46 (noting that the greatest relative decrease in civic
participation in recent years has been among the college-educated).
324. See id. at 214.
325. See id. at 96 ("[T]wentieth-century urbanization was not fatal to friendship.").
326. See id. at 248,252 tbl.3, 257-58.
327. See id. at 184.
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other organized spiritual groups often act as a vehicle for the use and
development of rich social capital, and can have a tremendous positive
impact on civic participation and democracy generally.3:
Similarly, one of the greatest contributions of Putnam's work
relates to the social activism of the 1960s and its contemporary
relevance. Putnam's work infers that many participating groups have
perhaps too self-assuredly assumed that the world has conformed to their
norms and expectations.329 Putnam suggests that the social reformers and
the baby boom generation may have set up social group structures that
have evolved from social capital enclaves to become top-heavy,
30
bureaucratic, and non-responsive as a result of their withdrawal.
A third major contribution of Putnam, consistent with the recent
U.S. Supreme Court activism, is that there should be a reinvigoration of
the policies of federalism and separation of powers. Putnam's work,
echoing the Supreme Court, ultimately suggests that, unless more power
and more incentive is brought to the people, the people will continue to
distrust both government and other citizens, and participation rates in
civil affairs will continue to erode. 33' Brash individualism and isolation
may eventually erupt into mass civil discord, confirming Plato's
prediction. 332
This remarkable case for federalism is unfortunately confounded by
trends in international trade, the political business, and trade
organizations under which it operates. As recently indicated by Justice
Kennedy, though trade governance is probably beneficial to all parties in
terms of material sustenance and peace, it is perhaps increasingly on the
threshold of being delegated to non-democratic and less democratically
accountable institutions. 333 Challenges arise in ensuring that democracies
thrive and people feel a sense of empowerment while attempting to
prevent some of the natural consequences of international business and
free enterprise; international business and free enterprise foster the
decentralization of power, and individual senses of empowerment, selfworth, and hope and must be enhanced. Even Robert Morris, the
328. See id. at 66-67.
329. See id. at 152-55.
330. See id. at 154.
331. See id. at 403.
332. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Profiles,
at
Supreme
Court
Justice
Justice
Kennedy,
333. See
Meet
http:llwww.c-span.org/classromllessonplans/courts/profilesl.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Kennedy Profile] ("We are in a world where many people will tell you that basic
policies should be made by international bodies .... a world where some people argue that only the
United Nations can go to war, and not the United States on its own behalf.").
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"financier" of the American Revolution, was an advocate of, and major
participant in, foreign trade, including with the Far East." Thus, foreign
trade and free enterprise are like first cousins to democracy and cannot
merely be dismissed. Free enterprise and capitalism, like the First
Amendment and social capital, have fostered ingenuity and creativity,
and overall have provided American culture with its ever-renewing
qualities.
A concomitant case presented by Putnam, indirectly but
pervasively, is that aggressive capitalism is creating ominous
implications for small business and lower-level capitalism in this
increasingly singularized, non-social capital society."' His subtle
message is that opportunity is the renewing force behind democracy; the
environment for capitalism ought to be maintained.33 6 If the aspiring
capitalist finds the doors of opportunity closed or made exceedingly
difficult to open despite ambition and talent, the counter-reaction against
democracy and capitalism itself could be swift and fatal.
V.

SOME SHORTFALLS OF PUTNAM'S WORK

Despite the enlightening surveys and analyses, Putnam's work may
miss a classic question often asked by social critics. Is civic apathy and
isolation a reflection of the fact that our institutions have, in fact,
outlived their usefulness, or, even more likely, that they are no longer
operating well? Americans, perhaps traditionally, have been observers of
the maxim, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." This may reflect the values of
social economy, efficiency, and wisdom. The real question, then, may be
whether Americans realistically perceive a need to fix or change the
system, or whether they will be content with toughing it out with only
incremental tinkering.
Indeed, contrary to Putnam's restrained warnings, there is much to
support the case that the computer is a great equalizer in democracy,
facilitating the dissemination of ideas and information necessary to an
open and free society.3 37 It can provide a sense of empowerment and
individual dignity, which may be necessary for democratic society. The
computer and similar modes of information dissemination have been
essential tools for groups to organize and collaborate in expression,

334. See ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS: PATRIOT AND FINANCIER
223-24 (1903).
335. See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 322-25.
336. See id. at 325.
337. See supra notes 308-21 and accompanying text.
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perhaps best demonstrated
by the experiences of Tiananmen Square in
33
1989 and Seattle in 1999. 3
An additional inherent weakness in Putnam's work is his failure to
explore the benefits behind a democracy with a foundation in civic
engagement and social capital. Democracies may inherently encourage
the formation of economic oligarchies, rather than theological
oligarchies or aristocracy.339 Most realists would agree that a pure
democracy could never exist in a society as complex as ours. Our best
hope is for a responsive, representative democracy, where the people
have the opportunity to be in the loop of power, along with having direct
power as well.
Unfortunately, Putnam's view of democracy may at times suggest
over-agreement with some baby boomer social reformers."' At other
times, he seems to subtly comment on the naive and unwitting belief in
democracy's staying power.'" This view may reflect a certain
absolutism, which bespeaks precisely of the tyranny warned of by major
philosophers. 2 Democracy derives its strength from the constant ebb
and flow of power: elites placed and displaced by the majority in a
system based on merit and constructive social contribution, that permits
everyone a chance on the elite ramp.Ma Putnam does not address whether
the current malaise and civic absenteeism is simply an expression of
satisfaction with the current elite.
Contrary to much of Putnam's thinking, our founding fathers
warned that, in the new democratic experiment, a highly motivated, selfinterested minority was a necessary evil to avoid mob rule and chaos.'
They hatched a brilliant balancing scheme whereby a nondemocratically established life-tenure judiciary, an electoral college
voting system, a Senate with broad approval and removal power, and
other arguably elite but liberalizing forces would all ultimately endeavor
to sustain the voice of the average person.Y5 This system, they thought,
338. See, e.g., NAN LIN, THE STRUGGLE FOR TiANANmEN: ANATOMY OF THE 1989 MAss
MOVEMENT 147-48 (1992); Villiam J. Dobson, Protest.org,NEwv REPUBLIC, July 6, 1998, at 18,20
(describing Chinese dissidents' use of the Internet); Greg Miller, WTO Summit: Protest in Seattle,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at A24; Margie Wylie, Technology Shapes New Generationof Activism,
Newhouse News Service, Oct. 9, 2000, at http://www.newhouse.comarchivelstorylal0l0O0.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
339. See supranotes 22-33 and accompanying text.
340. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 338-40.
341. See id. at 340-41.
342. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
343. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison).
344. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
345. See THE FEDERALiST Nos. 65, 68, 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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would thereby maintain opportunity and reinforce democracy;
essentially, the checks and balances of a representative government were
designed to avoid the very tyranny likely to result from pure
democracy.4 6
While extolling the virtues of pre-1960 social capital development,
and admitting that a society rich in social capital inevitably draws out
less desirable groups, Putnam does not adequately address clandestine,
terrorist, and other anti-democratic groupings of persons. 347 These
communities often behave like a cancer within our national boundaries,
thriving on the very same conditions and nutrients that social capital
does. Also, Putnam does not account for the dark sides of mass hysteria
and witch-hunts, which can threaten and subvert democratic processes.
The 1940s witnessed the Constitution's needless torture in the form of
mass Japanese internment camps, and the 1950s saw a government
behaving in particularly anti-democratic ways, with witch-hunts during
the Red Scare. These blemishes on the face of democracy coincided with
the peak of our country's social capital.34 In other words, social capital
may in fact contribute to the undermining of democracy itself, without
the very check of some structures inimical to social capital development.
Putnam, overall, affords this insufficient consideration.
On the other hand, Putnam may have a very important point
regarding the need for social capital. The very existence of social capital
in a vibrant and participatory citizenry may be the eight-foot iron fence
that keeps the wolf out of the chicken coop. The likelihood of challenges
by determined fanatical or antisocial groups of whatever persuasion may
well be mitigated by healthy and well-balanced forms of social capital,
with widespread civic participation and a thriving exercise of the
freedom of association.
In terms of omissions, Putnam's work does not cover what may be
termed "social ingenuity capital," one of the various forms of capital
necessary to a prosperous democracy."49 Convinced of the merits of
social capital, and inspired by Putnam's prescriptions, future
investigators should complete the task by evaluating how social
346. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison); see also Candace H. Beckett, Essay,
Separation of Powers and Federalism: Their Impact on Individual Liberty and the Functioning of
Our Government, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 635, 638-40 (1988).
347. Putnam does briefly discuss the potentially destructive uses of social capital in his
introduction, but does not expound on them at length (with the exception of youth gangs) elsewhere
in the book. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 21-22, 315-16.
348. See id. at 54-55 (noting that "[t]he two decades following 1945 witnessed one of the most
vital periods of community involvement in American history").
349.

See, e.g., THOMAS HOMER-DIXON, THE INGENUITY GAP 22-23 (2000).
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ingenuity and the blessings of a free and open society are best
encouraged. Much of Putnam's work reflects an obvious, but relatively
unsupported, central assumption that more social capital automatically
invites societal advancement, ingenuity, and resilience. While hopefully
true, quantitative data illuminating the causal relationship currently does
not exist and should be collected.
Related to this is the paradigm that Putnam creates in the final
portions of his work. He points to legislative law and policy initiatives
during the Progressive Era as worthy of emulation.35" He lauds that era's
response to the excesses of the Gilded Age and the resulting decline in
social capital.35' The lessons of history suggest that this model had some
serious limitations then, and that a twenty-first-century repetition or
variant of those themes may not necessarily be appropriate.
Communication, transportation, education, economic and population
structure, and internationalization were all keynotes of the dramatic
changes of the twentieth century. Footnoting these changes was the
diversification of race, ethnicity, and spirituality in America. Yet, the
country is presently undergoing so many dramatic changes that
homogeneity of anything is increasingly more difficult to discover.
Thus, the clay and girding necessary for redemption of our collective
civic mind must be found through new sources, tailored to fit current
issues. On a directly related point, while Putnam emphatically and
pervasively recognizes the fundamental role of law, lawyers, and rule of
law, he does not fully support it with quantitative data.352
In addition, Putnam may naively assume that change can be made
cheaply and that the dynamics can be made readily manageable without
the appearance of heated confrontation, coercion, violence, or even war.
Throughout our history, only significant and vociferous movements, at
considerable financial cost and other negative consequences, have been
able to achieve social change.353 Change, as advocated by Putnam, is
certainly within the realm of possibility, but its implementation will
require vast stores of tolerance and foresight with respect to minimizing
potential economic consequences. Further, reformers must respect the
fact that there would be no guarantee of success. Putnam does not
present a quantitative or theoretical analysis or a plausible warning of
such costs in his prescriptions for change.
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PTNArv, supranote 2, at 403.
id. at 382, 394-95.
id. at 144-47.
id. at 152-54.

524

HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 30:483

An additional shortfall of the work is the absence of data, working
hypotheses, and commentary on the capacity of society to essentially
emulate a suggested paradigm solution analogous to a Norman Rockwell
illustration, without more. Two major facets of this difficulty are
noteworthy. First, the rise of technology as the measure of wealth and
the demise of bridging spirituality may make such coalescence
exceedingly difficult. People are encouraged to at least become physical
islands unto themselves, in a race to existentialist and perhaps even
Kafkaesque individuation. Secondly, as already suggested, international
economic and quasi-political forces potentially have an enormous and
complex cross-jurisdictional impact on how we operate within an
increasingly likely international governance paradigm. Amid this
unprecedented process-and left for further work-are the possibilities
of drawing upon the experiences of the revolutionary era of the late
eighteenth century, which propelled the dawn of the democratic system,
in order to study how to reconcile these forces. In any event, a more
dynamic, broad-based analysis of historical precedent is required to fully
comprehend the implications of Putnam's twentieth-century quantitative
data. Merely turning the clock back assumes a static society and may
implicate a disastrous result.
For instance, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy has
observed that what amounts to a fourth tier of federalism may now be
confronting America. This fourth tier consists of international
governance authorities in multi-economic networks that are not
necessarily fully accountable, let alone receptive, to the American
public.3- Increasingly, American governmental institutions, under
international agreements, may be on the verge of ceding power to this
super tier. This delegation of power and responsibility may possibly
threaten the maintenance of the social fabric of individual communities.
On the other hand, some suggest that such international governmentwhether ad hoc or formal-may be the only mechanism by which to
ensure the greatest good for the greatest number, and may be necessary
to maintain equal opportunity and even democracy. The need for
addressing this puzzle or dilemma has been largely ignored by Putnam.
Bowling Alone's possible limitations also include the little attention
paid to some specific indications that trust and reciprocity may be
354. See Kennedy Profile, supra note 333 (stating that international policy issues are "very
fundamental, far-reaching issues [that] concern how you are going to be able to keep your freedom,
keep your traditions and still participate in a world where what you do affects people abroad").
355. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, InternationalGovernance andAmerican Democracy, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 237, 255-56 (2000).
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bouncing back. According to Putnam, while significant evidence clearly
shows civic malaise on the part of those born between 1945 and 1970,
his data suggests that the post-X Generation especially is becoming
more involved in certain areas. 6 While this could reflect a statistical
anomaly, more study is needed to identify whether this implies some
endemic change contrary to his thesis.
All in all, despite these shortcomings, Putnam's work can be read
as an audit or a measurement of the success of the current system of
laws. Bowling Alone offers revelations bearing upon the methodology
and purpose behind the formulation of legal rules in unprecedented
ways.
Justice Kennedy has indicated that the functions of the legislative
and executive branches of government have reached a crescendo of
imperfection. Their meaning and purpose have become so clouded that
often the American public feels as distant from its present government as
the patriots of 1776 felt from the British government. More pointedly,
Justice Kennedy observes that we might have reached a point in which
democratic values and culture survive solely due to the existence of an
independent judiciary and lawyers.357 However, Kennedy himself has
indicated the potential erosion of the Court's effectiveness in sustaining
the trust of the people, as well as the potential erosion of the law's
effectiveness in sustaining the respect of the people.3 58
This is cause for concern. It should also provoke action to activate
the redemptive forces of present democratic governance, and the
continuity of the democratic form of government. Putnam's work and
the bold, poignant thinking behind the current federalism thrust of the
Supreme Court reinforce one another and have come at the right time.
Yet, as stated by Walter Kiechel in the Harvard Business Review,
356. See, e.g., PT>NAM, supranote 2, at 265 ("Without any doubt the last ten years have seen a
substantial increasein volunteering and community service by young people.").
357. In a recent address to bar association leaders, Justice Kennedy described his new initiative
to "teach youths about fundamental values and principles of American democracy in light of the
Sept. 11 attacks." Lori Litchman, Justice Kennedy: Initiative Will Teach American Democracy,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 4, 2002, at 23. Stating that "'it would be irresponsible for the law to
have no response,"' Justice Kennedy argued that "'[o]ur young people, who will soon be the
principal trustees to our democratic institutions, must be well-prepared and well-advised, wellinstructed and well-schooled, in the institutions of our freedoms."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Justice Kennedy). In another address to Washington, D.C., high school students, he stated that
"[e]veryone is an advocate for freedom, and the lawyers should set that example.' Justice Anthony
Kennedy, Remarks to Students at School Without Walls Re: "Dialogue on Freedom" (Jan. 28,
2002), availableatLEXIS, Federal News Service File.
358. See Life in the Supreme Court: Roundtable (C-SPAN television broadcast, Dec. 14, 1999)
(Justice Anthony Kennedy addressing junior and senior high school students about his career at the
Supreme Court).
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"[Bowling Alone's] weak follow-through is enough to leave one
wondering
if social capital is an asset that can be effectively managed at
9
35

all.

VI. MORE PARTICULAR LEGAL RELEVANCIES OF PUTNAM'S WORK
One message of Bowling Alone is for the legal profession itself as
presently constituted. The message is that American lawyers are not
plumbers, nor should they be, at least in today's American culture that
has created many silent, subtle, and pervasive challenges that are better
addressed now. People are looking to the law and the profession to
replace the trust lost through eroding social capital structures 60
However, the practice of law in America was primarily designed to
correct, not prevent, breaches of social trust.36 There is a need for
retooling and, at least temporarily, more inductive approaches to
supplement the traditional deductive methodology of legal decisionmaking.
Dismayingly, Putnam provides data indicating not only citizens'
unprecedented mistrust of fellow citizens and of the government, but
also an increasing mistrust between members of the legal profession.362
The American Bar Association, a haven of community and social
networking for lawyers, reports membership down quite substantially in
relative terms. 363 As (or if) trust, reciprocity, and social capital decline in
the legal profession, the ability to foster an open societal discourse may
decline, and the legal profession, the judiciary, and, ultimately, the rule
of law may lose their principal functions as fair mediators of social
values and social stability.
The legal profession may increasingly be evolving from a
profession into a business or trade. The citizenry may eventually resist a
profession dedicated to righting wrongs and representing the individual
in the face of the powers of the state. Individuals could clamor for a
successor of questionable benevolence, perhaps allocating social capital
without accountability or even ending social capital altogether.
A second message for lawyers and the legal system relates to the
effect that trust in current laws, and our democracy, has had on the
volitional conduct of citizens. Falling social capital and the associated
359. Kiechel, supranote 116, at 154.
360. See supra notes 287-96 and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 436-47 (1992) (describing the notion
of "corrective justice" and the role it plays in "political freedom and autonomy").
362. See PUTNAM, supra note 2, at 147.
363. See id. app. II at 444.
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breakdown of the social bond of trust may extend into such critical areas
of government as tax collection. Putnam finds that people who have
greater social capital tend not to cheat on their taxes or engage in other
fraudulent acts, and that this is directly associated with civic
participation, volunteerism, honesty, and self-restraint. 36
Substantial social capital is essential to the effective operation of
government, whose principal purpose is to collect revenue and to
provide services and protection to the people.3 6 Tax compliance depends
upon social capital: "If we consider state differences in social capital, per
capita income, income inequality... social capitalis the only factor that
successfully predicts tax compliance."36 As such,
[t]he legitimacy of the tax system turns in part on the belief that we all
do our share. Yet we know that the IRS cannot possibly audit
everyone, so rational citizens have every reason to believe that if they
pay their share, they will indeed be subsidizing those who are not so
honor bound. It is a recipe for disillusionment with the IRS and the tax
system in general. 6 7
Tax revenues are based, for the most part, on the premise that we trust
citizens to honestly and voluntarily disclose income. Once the social
capital decreases, as a result of rising distrust of each other and the
government, citizens will lose the freedom to manage their own
incomes. More ominously, government may simply cease to exist and
ultimately be replaced.3'6 Basically, "individual taxpayers who believe
that others are dishonest or are distrustful of government are more likely
themselves to cheat."36 9
A similar result may impair our national defense. Military
conscription, discipline codes, and even the Constitution itself are
threatened if our voluntary civilian military structure is compromised.
These important tenets are hallmarks in world history and, like the First
Amendment, an intrinsic part of our democracy. 370 However, they, too,
may be suffering from a decline of social capital in the military ranks. 37'
364. See id. at 347-48.
365. See id. at 347.

366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See id.
369. Id.
370. See Dr. John Hillen, The Gap Betveen American Society and its Military: Keep It, Defend
It, Manage It, 4 J. NAT'L SECuRrrYL. 151, 152, 165 (2000).
371. See, e.g., David Wood, Army Confronting a Crisis of Morale and Purpose in Its Officer
Corps, Newhouse News Service, Dec. 24, 2000, at http://www.newhouse.com (last visited Jan. 23,
2001).

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 30:483

Recent surveys of military officers indicate increasing dissension and
distrust of junior officers toward senior officers, who may increasingly
be seen by subordinates as opportunistic or career-oriented, and not
idealistically selfless.372 Indeed, some studies find senior officers having
increasing distrust for civil leadership itself." This phenomenon, if
valid, provides one of democracy's greatest single challenges. Intensive
and directed military spending may not be sufficient to alleviate the
problem. Rather, concerted action to rebuild social networking, trust,
and honesty through social capital-sensitive public policy is required to
maintain a democracy-compatible military.
A related legal issue posed by Putnam's work, and supplementing
other recent works, is how to effectively assess and implement the will
of the people, a pervasive legal concept interlaced throughout our
Constitution and voting laws, as exemplified by initiatives and
referenda.374 Indeed, democratic government institutions have had a
presumptive legitimacy based on the assumption that the people running
them are accountable to the citizenry, often through a free and
scrutinizing press and open elections.375
With people demanding less of the press, declining civic
participation and voting, and increasing cynicism and apathy, the will of
the people runs the risk of increasing emasculation. It has even become
quite difficult to determine the will of the people. This disengagement of
the people essentially transforms the process of rulemaking. Putnam
suggests that rulemaking cannot reflect or determine the will of the
people without strong social capital, regardless of whether the
democracy is direct or representative.376

Officers seek in daily life those values that sound corny to civilians but betoken the
soldier's highest ideals: honor, duty, courage, honesty. Doing the right thing when no
one's watching.
And that is why officers are quick to detect political correctness, shading of the truth
and sliding ethical standards in themselves, their colleagues and especially in their senior
officers.
Id.
372. See id.
373. See id. There are clear political underpinnings for this phenomenon, which may also
contribute to a growing distrust between the military and the civilian elite. See Adam Clymer, Sharp
Divergence Found in Views of Military and Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at A20 (noting
that an increasingly Republican military elite is "'scary' to civilians and was responsible for
considerable tension during the Democratic Clinton administration).
374. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 163.
375. See id. at 218; DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 172-74 ("The sovereignty of the people
and freedom of the press are.., two entirely correlative things ... .
376. See PUTNAM, supranote 2, at 349.
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We might think that public initiatives and referenda afford citizens
a more direct voice in government and policy. They may also grant
policymakers a mechanism for determining the will of the people.
Putnam, however, notes that this perception ignores a crucial fact: his
data reveals that such petitions are increasingly of the few, by the few,
and for the few."' He cites studies showing that a successful statewide
ballot initiative depends upon how successful its supporters are in
obtaining financial backing and how successful their professional
marketing and advertising campaigns have been. 78 He concludes, "[i]n
short, the rise of ballot initiatives is a better measure of the power of
well-financed special interests than of civic engagement."37 9 Thus,
without a re-examination and re-tooling of such mechanisms of popular
policy expression, the will of the people will continue to be obfuscated
behind special interest groups and deceptive advertising. 8
The implications of declining social capital on criminal law and
corrections are also ominous. Community norms and standards of social
behavior are formulated and maintained only by community consensus
through efforts requiring social capital.
Without such structures,
identifying standards of appropriate behavior becomes a meaningless
and impossible exercise, as norms become a matter of individual
discretion.3 That discretion results in community disintegration and
damages social trust and reciprocity. 3 The inevitable result is that
criminal law may take on characteristics typical of totalitarian systems."
In addition, laws regarding media and communications, and
policies with respect to television broadcasting, films, wireless
communications, telecommunications, and other forms of entertainment,
are affected by Putnam's findings. Putnam suggests that the public
policy underlying the law be directed at using these forms of media to
facilitate engagement in community, rather than as a mechanism for

377. See id. at 163-64.
378. See id.
379. Id. at 164.
380. See id.
381. See id. at312.
382. See id.
383. See id. According to sociologist Robert Sampson, "lack of social capital is one of the
primary features of socially disorganized communities." Robert J. Sampson, Family Management
and Child Development: Insightsfrom Social DisorganizationTheory, in 3 FACTS, FRAMEWORKS,
AND FORECASTS: ADVANCES IN CRMINOLOGICAL THEORY 63,78 (Joan McCord ed., 1992).
384. Youth gangs in inner-city neighborhoods are a prime example. See PuTNAM, supra note
2, at 316 ("Where constructive social capital and institutions are allowed to wither, gangs emerge to
fill the void.").
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isolation or entertainment only." 5 Technology has enabled greater
numbers of people to exchange greater amounts of information over a
wider array of mediums from greater distances. 86 Putnam expresses
concern over recent, albeit limited, data suggesting that computer
communication, while formerly extolled as the great equalizer and a
boon for increased social contact, is increasingly supplanting face-toface social contact, having a negative impact upon social capital and
social connectedness, decreasing civic engagement, and increasing
passive and private non-engagement. 7
Putnam indicates that public policy and law can affect that
awesome industry to respond with greater efforts at mitigating these
consequences.3 18 However, legal rules affecting computer-mediated
communication will have to be more carefully drafted to ensure privacy
protection and a non-interventionist role for government for the purpose
of exercising First Amendment freedoms. 9
Putnam indirectly suggests that the ramps to economic mobility
through small-enterprise capitalism are gradually eroding in the face of
changing economic paradigms and as the landscape of work and
community evolves. 39° Economic oligarchies have a certain permanence
and role in society because of the nature of democratic capitalism and
the realities of a consumerist cultural mentality, which goes back several
centuries.39' Putnam's thesis and data indicate that public policy and laws
must be drafted so as to provide communities more control over local
economic structures and, above all, to encourage entrepreneurism and
small business.392
Without such policy underpinning laws, Putnam indicates, a
hollowing out of both the spiritual aspect and the geographic aspect of
community will occur, and social capital will decline.39 3 For instance, the
managers and owners of the large discount stores are less likely to be
seen by those in town than a local merchant. Certainly, even if the large
company owners are seen, they are seen impersonally, without any
contribution to the social capital. Laws regarding the organization and
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continued regulation and capitalization of small business should be
evaluated using the test of net effect on social capital.
There are other specific areas of law to which Putnam makes his
work relevant, both expressly and by implication. Some are quite
endemic, such as citizens' failure to exercise their right to seek public
office. 9 Putnam indicates that, by not participating in governmental
institutions and other civic-minded groups, people gain no real
experience in the functioning and meaning of democracy. 95 Thus, the
mechanisms of democracy begin to be perceived solely as endeavors of
the few, an impenetrable obstacle to participation."'
Perhaps relatedly, Putnam suggests that efforts by special interest
groups have evolved to rely on local communities for financial backing,
while looking to Washington, D.C., for policy backing and governance
authority.9 7 The basis for some important bodies of law, such as
financing and lobbying, takes on new interest here.
Putnam's work strongly urges reform and scrutiny of labor and
employment law as well, to respond to the increasingly social capital
malaise affecting the workplace. 99 Putnam states that the workplace no
longer provides a sense of community or security!3 " He cites data
indicating that workers and employers share less loyalty and trust with
each other, and that more antipathy is felt between workers as working
hours, productivity demands, and competition between workers rise.
Putnam prescribes legal rules to make the workplace more familyfriendly and community-congenial. 4° This invokes issues of public
regulation of employment contracts, incentive-based regulations, and
policies to support flexible work schedules, parental leave for both
parents, time off to care for sick family members, and community
volunteerism.4 He also recommends that family law rule formulations
incorporate these new workplace-related social capital findings.4 3
As suggested above, many of Putnam's findings and express
recommendations have a direct impact on land use, zoning, and
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environmental laws.' Putnam indicates that the breakdown of social
capital and community corresponds directly with proximity
relationships: the time used to traverse the distance between work, home,
and outside socialization. 4°5 He finds that the number of commuters has
increased exponentially over the past three decades. 4 The result is social
and civic fatigue and further detriment to the development and
maintenance of the mechanisms of social capital.4° He also advocates a
re-engineering of local planning legal principles, which he indicates
must focus on the importance of social relationships rather than on the
automobile. 4° '
VII.

CONCLUSION

Many of Putnam's concerns, including the issues addressed, the
connections made, and the implications upon legal and democratic
systems, are not new. What is groundbreaking is the breadth and depth
to which what seems like straightforward social science is ultimately and
pervasively directed to the law. Putnam's work is a subtle yet pervasive
survey of the assumptions on how legal rules are made. He also helps us
visualize how the legal rules of the future may be affected by the social
capital variable.
The law and legal rules structure determines civilization. This
means that, in the end, the trusteeship of those associated with legal rulemaking and implementation is a big one. Bowling Alone's meaning is
best understood from this perspective, and that is why it is important.
The discourse is supported to an unprecedented degree by long overdue,
hard, well-organized, and quantitative proof, and perhaps very good
timing.

404. See id. at 407-08.
405. See id. at213.
406. See id. Interestingly, actual time spent commuting has increased by only 14 percent, due
primarily to an increase in the speed of the average commute achieved by a switch from mass transit
to single-occupancy vehicles. See id. However, although faster travel may be "quicker for the
individual worker," it is "socially inefficient." Id. It may also be offset by increased traffic
congestion. See id.
407. See id.
408. See id. at 407-08.

